The attacks on the Russian submarine Rostov-on-Don and the landing ship Minsk during the night of September 13th were executed by Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces.

Special forces officers have disclosed specific aspects of the operation. They received intelligence from multiple sources about the probable location of the Minsk large landing ship and the Rostov-on-Don diesel-electric submarine at a ship repair facility in the temporarily occupied city of Sevastopol.

To pinpoint targets, guide the attack, and gather intelligence within the operational area of the Russians, Special Operations Forces deployed skilled operatives. The group reached a secure location by boat and proceeded to the shore using underwater delivery vehicles.

After a successful infiltration into specific Russian positions, the soldiers began executing the primary phase of the operation. They utilized specialized reconnaissance equipment for target identification and designation. During the actual strike (in which the Ukrainian Air Force deployed Storm Shadow cruise missiles), the group conducted fire adjustments and verified target destruction.

Following this, the Special Operations Forces successfully withdrew their personnel from the combat zone, known as exfiltration.

Also Read: Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal Grows: 170 Warheads and Counting

A statement from the Special Operations Forces expressed appreciation for the professionalism and daring of their soldiers. The release of this information comes after a period, considering operational security, to convey to the enemy that there are no safe havens for them.

On the night of September 12th-13th, the authorities in the occupied city of Sevastopol reported that a missile attack led to a fire at a shipyard near Kilen-balka. The Russian Ministry of Defence also confirmed a missile attack, along with actions by unmanned surface vessels, resulting in damage to two ships.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) researchers indicated that a Ropucha-class large landing ship and a Kilo-class submarine sustained damage at a shipyard in occupied Sevastopol. The Russian Telegram channel Baza reported that the Minsk large landing ship and the Rostov-on-Don diesel-electric submarine were affected by the attack. Notably, the Rostov-on-Don submarine, launched in 2014, is equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles, which the Russian Federation has deployed against Ukrainian cities.

According to UK Intelligence, the Russian large landing ship Minsk and the Rostov-on-Don diesel-electric submarine, both undergoing dry-dock repairs in Sevastopol, sustained significant damage as a result of the strike by Ukraine.

On the afternoon of September 13th, Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, expressed gratitude to Ukrainian pilots for their actions in causing explosions in temporarily occupied Sevastopol.

Prominent American nuclear scientists have estimated that Pakistan currently possesses around 170 nuclear warheads, and this number may potentially increase to approximately 200 by 2025, based on the current expansion rate.

As reported by PTI, citing the Nuclear Notebook column published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on September 11, the scientists explained, “We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of approximately 170 warheads. The US Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020, but several new weapon systems have been fielded and developed since then, which leads us to a higher estimate.”

The Nuclear Notebook is a regular feature produced by the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project. It is authored by Project Director Hans M. Kristensen, Senior Research Fellow Matt Korda, and Research Associate Eliana Johns. This column has been a consistent publication in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987.

The scientists noted that their estimate comes with considerable uncertainty due to the limited information available about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, as neither Pakistan nor other countries publish detailed information about it.

Given the lack of reliable data from Pakistan, the Nuclear Notebook used a methodology that relied on a combination of open-source materials and analytical work for their estimates. Their information sources included both state-originating data, such as government announcements, declassified documents, budgetary information, military demonstrations, and treaty disclosures, as well as non-state-originating data, such as media reports, think tank assessments, and industry publications. Additionally, they made extensive use of commercial satellite imagery as part of their data sources.

The scientists also noted that with Pakistan developing new delivery systems, four plutonium production reactors, and an expanding uranium enrichment infrastructure, the country’s nuclear stockpile could potentially increase further over the next few years. The rate of growth will depend on various factors, including Pakistan’s nuclear-capable launchers, evolving nuclear strategy, and India’s nuclear arsenal’s growth. They estimated that the stockpile could reach around 200 warheads by the late 2020s if the current growth rate continues.

Also Read: Nuclear Deal Standoff: UK, France, and Germany Hold Firm on Iran Sanctions

However, they also suggested that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed, unless India significantly expands its arsenal or builds up its conventional forces.

The scientists also acknowledged that calculating stockpile size based solely on fissile material inventory could overestimate the number of nuclear warheads, but they estimated that Pakistan is currently producing enough fissile material to potentially build 14 to 27 new warheads per year, with an actual annual increase in the stockpile of around 5 to 10 warheads.

In addition to estimating the number of warheads, the Nuclear Notebook provided information on Pakistan’s nuclear-capable aircraft and air-delivered weapons, as well as details about the country’s ballistic missile systems, cruise missiles, and missile bases and facilities.

It’s worth noting that the total number and location of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable missile bases and facilities remain unknown, but the Nuclear Notebook listed several missile bases and provided coordinates and other details.

The scientists also discussed Pakistan’s family of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles and their development, as well as the development of multiple-warhead capabilities intended as a countermeasure against India’s ballistic missile defense system. They acknowledged the limited public information available about warhead production but mentioned the suspicion that Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, northwest of Islamabad, serve a role in this regard.

The UK, France, and Germany have declared that they will not lift sanctions on Iran as originally scheduled under the 2015 nuclear deal, a decision that is likely to anger Tehran and further jeopardize the viability of the agreement.

As per the terms of the original deal, certain UN sanctions were set to be lifted on October 18, 2023, through a sunset clause that would have allowed Iran to engage in the import and export of ballistic missiles, including missiles and drones with a range exceeding 300 kilometers (186 miles).

In a letter addressed to the EU’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, the three European signatories to the deal, collectively known as the E3, explained that Iran’s substantial breaches of the agreement, such as exceeding limits on stored enriched uranium and restricting UN inspectors’ access to its nuclear program, necessitated the continuation of sanctions related to its ballistic missile program.

The E3 asserted that their decision not to lift sanctions in line with the original sunset clause did not violate the agreement, as it contained mechanisms for addressing disputes regarding compliance.

The UK stated that it had raised concerns about Iranian non-compliance in 2020, but Iran had not responded, nor had it done so within the agreed 30-day deadline.

Borrell acknowledged receipt of the letter and quoted the foreign ministers as stating that Iran had been in non-compliance since 2019 and that this had not been resolved through the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) dispute resolution mechanism. Consequently, they expressed their intention not to proceed with lifting further sanctions on the JCPOA transition day, set for October 18, 2023.

Also Read: Stalemate Continues: Kosovo Rejects EU Compromise in Belgrade-Pristina Talks

The UK underscored its commitment, along with its partners, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium was described as being “beyond all credible civilian justification.”

The UN sanctions that were scheduled to be lifted on October 18 targeted individuals and entities involved in Iran’s missile, nuclear, and other weapons programs, and will now be incorporated into the domestic legislation of the UK, France, and Germany.

A spokesperson for the UK’s Foreign Office stated that they, along with their French and German counterparts, had taken a legitimate and proportionate step in response to Iran’s actions. While they remain committed to a diplomatic solution, Iran is now expected to take clear steps toward de-escalation, and the aim is to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

The UK highlighted that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium was 18 times beyond the limits established in the JCPOA, and Iran had constructed and deployed hundreds of advanced centrifuges. Iran had justified these actions as a response to the United States’ withdrawal from the deal during Donald Trump’s presidency.

During a recent board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 63 countries signed a statement asserting that Iran had violated its commitment to explain the discovery of uranium particles at undisclosed sites to UN nuclear inspectors.

It was also noted that Iran had diluted a portion of its stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium. Israel has claimed that Iran possesses enough enriched uranium to construct a nuclear bomb within a week, although it lacks the means to deliver such a weapon.

Separate from the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran had reached an informal agreement with the United States, whereby Iran agreed not to increase its enriched uranium beyond 60% and to release five US citizens held in Iran. In return, the US was expected to release $6 billion in Iranian assets held in South Korea, as well as five Iranian prisoners held in the US.

The five US prisoners have already been released from Evin jail in Tehran and are currently residing elsewhere in the capital. One of them is Morad Tahbaz, a British-American environmentalist who was arrested in 2018 and left behind when then-British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss negotiated the release of two British-Iranians, Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Anoosheh Ashoori.

Iran’s permanent mission to the UN in New York confirmed that, as part of a prisoner-swap deal, the five Iranian nationals who were held for circumventing US sanctions would be released. Some of them will return to Iran, while others will remain in the US.

The latest round of talks aimed at normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo ended without a breakthrough on Thursday (September 14). Pristina rejected a compromise proposal from the EU, which it claimed favored Belgrade’s stance.

Josep Borrell, the EU’s chief diplomat, expressed disappointment, saying, “We made significant efforts, but regrettably, we were unable to bridge the gaps today,” following the talks in Brussels.

This meeting between Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti marked their first face-to-face encounter within the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue process since clashes erupted in North Kosovo, which has a significant Serb minority, in late May.

The previous talks in June only involved separate discussions with Borrell and the EU’s Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák, yielding no concrete results.

In Thursday’s meeting, the two leaders once again failed to agree on advancing the implementation of the EU-brokered Ohrid Agreement, which seeks to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Kosovo insists that Serbia must take the initial steps by officially recognizing its independence, including mutual recognition of documents. However, Belgrade wants progress on a deal to create an association of ten Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo.

Also Read: Europe’s Unified Stand: UK, France, and Germany Maintain Nuclear Sanctions on Iran

Borrell explained that the EU proposed a compromise involving parallel progress, which was accepted by Vučić but rejected by Kurti.

Kurti accused EU mediators of bias, asserting that the EU had adopted Serbia’s position. He emphasized the need to overcome the conditionality imposed by Serbia.

Vučić stated that Serbia accepted the EU’s compromise proposal, but Kurti did not, leading to the meeting’s conclusion. He argued that Kurti was avoiding the formation of the Association of Serbian-majority municipalities, which he viewed as the crux of the matter.

The EU side expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress six months after the Ohrid Agreement. Borrell criticized both Kosovo and Serbia for not fulfilling their dialogue obligations, warning that their inaction could affect their aspirations for EU accession. Serbia gained EU candidate status in 2012 and began accession talks in 2014, while Kosovo is not yet an official candidate.

Borrell also noted that there was no progress on resolving the dispute over elections in northern Kosovo, which had triggered unrest in May. He urged Pristina to hold new elections in northern Kosovo immediately.

In May, violence erupted when ethnic Albanian mayors were installed following contentious polls in which local Serbs refused to participate, leading to clashes between Serb protesters and NATO peacekeepers.

Borrell criticized Kosovo’s efforts to de-escalate tensions, stating that they fell short of international requests, including the EU’s call to withdraw special police from institutional buildings and prepare for new elections.

The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have opted to maintain sanctions on Iran as a means to discourage Tehran from supplying drones and missiles to Russia.

In 2015, Iran entered into a nuclear agreement that included the prospect of lifting certain sanctions next month. However, the European nations argue that Iran violated the agreement by enriching and stockpiling uranium.

Iran has responded by labeling this move “illegal and provocative” and asserting that it clearly breaches the terms of the nuclear deal.

According to European diplomatic sources, the decision to retain sanctions is motivated not only by the desire to prevent Iran from benefiting economically but also to minimize the risk of Tehran transferring ballistic missiles to Russia. Iran has already sold numerous drones to Moscow, which have been used in the conflict in Ukraine.

The E3 countries explicitly stated that these sanctions are aimed at “sustaining measures related to nuclear proliferation concerning Iran, as well as embargoes on arms and missiles.”

The European powers have announced their intention to incorporate expiring United Nations sanctions into their own legal frameworks. Some of these measures are designed to prevent Iran from developing and exporting ballistic missiles and drones. Despite these sanctions, Russia has deployed Iranian-made drones in its conflict in Ukraine.

Iran initially agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) eight years ago, a deal involving a group of world powers known as the P5+1: the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Germany. Under the 2015 accord, Iran committed to limiting its sensitive nuclear activities and granting access to international inspectors in exchange for the removal of crippling economic sanctions. The agreement also prohibited the purchase, sale, or transfer of drones and missiles to and from Iran.

Also Read: Powering the Future: Turkey and China Close in on Nuclear Plant Deal

The JCPOA envisioned a “transition day” eight years later when remaining sanctions related to ballistic missiles and nuclear activities would be lifted from Iran. The agreement also included an asset freeze targeting individuals and organizations believed to be advancing Iran’s nuclear program.

Countries like Russia and China will no longer be bound by these restrictions if they do not implement sanctions similar to those imposed by the UK, France, and Germany before October 18. The E3 nations, collectively known as the E3, have declared that the sanctions will persist until Iran fully complies with the terms of the deal.

Iran contends that this decision flagrantly violates the E3’s obligations under the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which calls on Iran not to engage in any activities related to ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The E3, however, maintains that their decision aligns with the JCPOA because Iran has twice declined opportunities to return to compliance and has expanded its program beyond the JCPOA’s limitations without credible civilian justifications.